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~~Top Secret~~*Directorate
of Intelligence*Intelligence Memorandum
Office of East Asian Analysis
1 December 1992**North Korea Watch,
1 - 30 November***Summary*

The North-South dialogue remained at a virtual standstill during November as P'yongyang unilaterally postponed the initial meetings of the Joint Reconciliation, Military, Economic, and Sociocultural Commissions to protest continued US-South Korean planning for the Team Spirit military exercise. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission met twice but made no progress toward a bilateral nuclear inspection agreement. Tensions also increased between P'yongyang and the IAEA as the North threatened to refuse further inspections unless Team Spirit is scrapped.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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This memorandum was prepared by the Offices of East Asian Analysis, Imagery Analysis, and Scientific and Weapons Research, in the Directorate of Intelligence.

Information available as of
30 November 1992 was used in its preparation.

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Status of Negotiations on the Reconciliation Accord

In November North Korea suspended negotiations to implement the reconciliation accord in protest of planning for resumption of the annual US-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit in 1993. Moreover, P'yongyang threatened to halt the dialogue completely if the South did not announce cancellation of Team Spirit by 30 November.¹ For their part, South Korean officials said they would not change their plans unless the two sides succeeded in carrying out bilateral nuclear inspections before the December prime-ministerial meeting. []

As a result of this impasse, the North and South did not hold the initial meetings of the Joint Reconciliation, Military, Economic, and Sociocultural Commissions that had been scheduled in November. They also failed to open a military hotline on 6 November as they had agreed at the September prime-ministerial. Nonetheless, the Prime Ministers are still set to meet in Seoul 21-24 December for their ninth round of high-level talks. []

Status of Negotiations on the Denuclearization Accord

In November debate over joint US-South Korean military exercises dominated the nuclear talks. P'yongyang postponed the 10th meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission from 10 to 18 November to protest what it called the South's "antidialogue" attitude--pointing in particular to the Foal Eagle and Hwarang exercises that were then under way []

The Joint Nuclear Control Commission

Tenth JNCC Meeting, 18 November. The two sides failed to discuss the terms for a bilateral inspection regime. [] The North's delegates [] spent the entire meeting denouncing Team Spirit and threatening to suspend the North-South dialogue unless Seoul canceled the exercise. The South argued the Team Spirit issue could be "resolved" if the two sides finalized a bilateral regime and undertook inspections before the December prime-ministerial talks. []

Eleventh JNCC Meeting, 27 November. There was no progress in this meeting, according to press reports. The North again demanded Seoul cancel Team Spirit by the end of November. The South reiterated that the two sides must first agree on the inspection regime and conduct at least one bilateral inspection before Team Spirit could

¹In the past the North has withdrawn from inter-Korean talks for several months during and after the exercise, which is usually held between January and March. Seoul did not hold the 1992 exercise as a gesture to P'yongyang on the conclusion of the reconciliation and denuclearization accords. []

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be addressed. The North reportedly rejected the South's proposal for a working level meeting, but the commission chairmen agreed to set a date for the next JNCC meeting through the liaison office at Panmunjom. []

Assessing P'yongyang's Propaganda Line

In November P'yongyang reacted to charges linking North Korea to proliferation activities. The media extolled North Korean-Syrian military ties in connection with a visit by Chief of General Staff Choe Kwang to Damascus during 29 October-4 November but also showed sensitivity to Western reports--one of which coincided with Choe's visit--about the North's missile proliferation and chemical and biological warfare program:

- Disregarding the obvious risk of raising international concern about the regime's involvement in arms proliferation, P'yongyang's media gave unusually heavy coverage to Vice Marshal Choe's visit. Reports described meetings with Syrian officials, including President al-Asad, as involving discussions of "friendship and cooperation between the armies" of the two countries and seeking "ways to develop these relations." Choe, who is also a Politburo member, was the third senior North Korean official to visit Syria in the past four months; Foreign Minister and Politburo member Kim Yong-nam and Finance Minister Yun Ki-chong made separate visits in July.
- Reacting to a *US News and World Report* article--released on 31 October--that a North Korean ship was allegedly on its way to Syria and Iran with some 100 Scud missiles, the Korea Central News Agency on 11 November belatedly called the report "a false rumor" planted by the CIA.
- On 30 October a Foreign Ministry spokesman characterized allegations by "some US media" that P'yongyang possesses "a stockpile of chemical and germ warfare weapons" as "another slander" that the United States and South Korea concocted in order to increase tension on the Korean Peninsula. []

IAEA Developments

During November North Korea appeared to be on the brink of ending its cooperation with the IAEA, which concluded its fourth ad hoc inspection at Yongbyon on 13 November. [] the North became increasingly uncooperative throughout []--particularly after a Foreign Ministry statement on 2 November warned that the Team Spirit military exercise and US pressure on the nuclear issue could

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put future IAEA inspections at risk. For example, when queried as to the location of liquid radioactive waste sites, North Korean officials offered no satisfactory response. They also accused the chief IAEA inspector of being an instrument of US intelligence.

On 16 November the IAEA notified P'yongyang it wanted to conduct an informal visit to undeclared facilities at Yongbyon.

The North counterproposed that its Minister of Atomic Energy visit Vienna to discuss safeguards issues. The IAEA accepted P'yongyang's proposal but argued the minister's trip should take place after the IAEA's visit to Yongbyon. P'yongyang did not respond to the IAEA's original request, however, forcing the inspectors to suspend plans for their visit.



The IAEA must now determine its next steps. The proposed visit had been planned to immediately precede the 3 December IAEA Board of Governors meeting.

The IAEA could still use the Board meeting to raise the ante by requesting a formal special inspection at Yongbyon and arguing that immediate access is required to determine whether the North is hiding nuclear material.


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


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
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
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

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
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Looking Ahead: A North Korean Calendar

3-4 December

IAEA Board of Governor's Meeting

21-24 December


Ninth prime-ministerial talks in Seoul

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



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


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SUBJECT: North Korea Watch,
1 - 30 November







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